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Abstract 
Reality contains information (significant) that becomes significances in the mind of the observer. 
Language is the human instrument to understand reality. But is it possible to attain this reality? Is there an 
absolute reality, as certain philosophical schools tell us? The reality that we perceive, is it just a 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Our starting point is the recognition of Reality that is beyond us, but we can get in touch 
in different ways. We have two great tools to access this reality: 
1) Logic, to organize it and make it so manageable. 
2) Language, to make it strong and to be able to share it.  
Thanks to these tools (but not only them) build scientific theories and philosophical 
systems, discuss, argue, give lectures, write books, etc,... build new tools that we use to 
try to domesticate reality. The justification for this device is practical: we need to deal 
with Reality in order to operate on it, even though we know that what we are handling is 
made from a particular perspective. There is a radical difference between what we know 
and the continuous, complex and vast reality, that we dissect with some tools that 
simplify and reduce it to a manageable size. 
There is an inadequacy of language and discursive thought to express reality, and, in 
general, there is a failure of systems to think about the world around us. 
Systematization, on the one hand is a natural tendency of the human spirit "to consider 
what we know as complete, and to make everything symmetrical" and, moreover, this is 
a trend that pays off many times, as systematization brings simplicity and therefore, 
ease of management and foresight. But we would be dogmatic if we thought that any 
useful tool can replace the real thing, or it can be applied with equal success to any 
reality. Put another way, the limitations of the two systems are: 
1) Simplify systems, there is something of the Reality that the scheme does not 
catch. 
2) Each individual situation is different, wanting to implement a known system 
instead of getting to the task of thinking is simply to refuse to look at the reality 
in front of us. 
A particular case of this mismatch between our tools and Reality shows noting the 
conventional character limits classifications. In the areas of our expertise that is labeled 
as "matters of degree." We must recognize the vagueness of many of the concepts that 
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result from a dissected reality. Since this is offered as continuous and gradual, our 
classifications artificially divide Reality and thus to be nuanced, it cannot be said nor 
thought of as absolutely clear whether a particular object is or is not within a a particular 
class. But recognizing the conventional nature of many classifications (and, therefore, 
the vagueness of their application) does not mean giving up our use of them. Yhis 
recognition leads us to know how to use the classifications without being totally 
committed to them. Classifications is a very useful tool: they are schemes to think, to 
describe, to teach and even to facilitate observation. But to know how to use a 
classification one needs to be aware of these instrumental difficulties. When this is 
understood, nothing prevents even that can serve different classifications for the same 
things: everyone can contribute something useful to the description of the reality that we 
know. And, even more, the next step is learning to think about reality in all its 
complexity is to know that all language can be seen as a great filing system, and that the 
right attitude is, again, the use of it without being overcome by it. 
When we apply an attribute to a subject, what we are doing is to find a place within a 
simplified scheme in which the complexity of reality never quite fits. Consequently, to 
think it is necessary to distinguish reality of our expressions. And although this may 
seem banal advice, things are as they are, but when we try to explain how they are 
using language, the nature of this tool prevents us from working with a very finely tuned 
tool: we always get, whatever we try to do more or lesser generality, as a schematic 
representation, and therefore it has some unsuitability. Hence there is a danger of 
transferring the ontological plane to the linguistic level (moving from an attribute, for 
example, to a  contradiction with reality that sometimes we think is useful). Again, 
thinking well requires recognizing the instrumental nature of Science, i.e., requires 
realizing that what Science gives us is not Reality and not the whole Reality. A 
recognition that, moreover, is not to deny the true nature of sciencetific knowledge. The 
sciences are systems that humans use to understand the world. Its schematic character 
provides distinct advantages over other types of knowledge (accuracy, reduction laws, 
predictability). But that same schematic character is the cause of a failure it is important 
not to forget. 
One advantage of philosophical thought about the scientist is that, being less mediated 
by previous schemes, it is able to recognize the difference between reality and 
systematization. Philosophy acquires, in addition, a clarifying respect for science. In his 
effort to think more directly the reality, the philosopher realizes the systematization of 
all instrumental and is thus more able to place science, recognizing its value but also its 
limitations. Differences between knowledge are not essential, but of degree. 
 
Human knowledge is the deployment of a unique way to open up to the world, but it 
moves to deepen successive levels of analysis. For example, a certain level of 
knowledge would be that of a scientist who studies the movement drawing on the notion 
of force, but it is possible to move to a deeper level, in which the scientist analyzes the 
notion of force, even making assumptions (without analyzing) about the data of 
perception, and it is possible, still, to move to a third deeper level where you begin to 
analyze the data before any categorization, thus passing to the philosophy of 
consciousness. Now, each new level represents a different level of generality and 
abstraction, on the one hand, and of clarity and precision, on the other. To deepen 
knowledge, one passes from the concrete to the abstract, from the general to the less 
general, and therefore from the diaphanous to the opaque. 
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All these levels are deep knowledge, and not all knowledge may be grasped in the same 
way. 
The highest degree of confidence in knowledge is attributed to the sciences: we have 
created tools with which we lock (or try to lock) accurate molds on reality, and therefore 
"is very easy to see and describe", i.e., it is easy to think about Reality linguistically and 
communicate it to others. Captured by a language with precise meanings, knowledge is 
solidified, like we can grasp with hands and lean on it. The systematization, rigid 
schemes of science are like a skeleton holding it up. But not just knowledge based on 
science: it is possible (and inevitable) to move to deeper levels. But as we go deeper, 
that is, as we think philosophically, we leave those precise tools and try to get in touch 
with reality more directly, or what is the same, roughly bounded by fixed patterns. 
Without the rigid systems skeleton, knowledge then becomes fluid: the words are no 
longer defined as a contour and therefore is more difficult to communicate and agree. 
What is left is not so easily grasped, and this is the price paid for a plastic or flexible 
knowledge, which is better suited to the chiaroscuro of Reality. Delving deeper means 
abandoning a very precise knowledge of a small piece of Reality, and scrolling provides 
increasingly confused knowledge of ever wider areas of Reality. 
At the level of science schematized reality is easy to describe, and the language puts 
everything in its place, but what we see is thus only a very poor picture of what we had 
before. In-depth analysis, widens the scope of known reality, but with some confusion: 
"more light more confusion", i.e., the more we soak in reality, the less it is systematized. 
And we realize, then, the artificial nature of those tools, that deep levels play no clear 
role. The best attitude with the tools is to take them for what they are and use what they 
are designed for. 
Science gives us knowledge of reality that has the advantage of clarity and precision: 
with sharp tools it is much easier to handle reality(make understandable data, make 
predictions, discover new data...). But it would be absurd to believe that it is known to 
all, like trying for the same precision as philosophy of science. In contrast to the 
strength of science, the advantage is that where philosophy is concerned, in general, 
discourse about abstract realms of life pays the price of being content with less solid 
knowing. 
 
2. THE ACCESS TO REALITY 
 
Whatever the intended meaning of the famous saying of Protagoras, "Man is the 
measure of all things" it is ordinarily understood in an epistemological sense, as a 
statement of the relativity of all human knowledge, of the impossibility to penetrate 
beyond the appearance of things. And this interpretation is consistent with the general 
trend of the times in which Protagoras lived. The doctrine of Heraclitus on the perpetual 
flow and universal vision of Parmenides that plurality and change are just a reflection of 
reality, the vain attempts to explain the nature of sensory perception and explain the 
illusions and misjudgments, along with the beginnings of consciousness (evident in 
Democritus), a subjective factor in the process of perception, all this suggested to 
philosophers to distrust what their senses showed and rely exclusively on their reason or 
intelligence. With reflection, however, it soon became clear that rational theories could 
not claim boast of greater consistency than the experience of perception, and the 
inevitable result of this was that the relativism of Protagoras and his followers gradually 
became the skepticism of the Middle Academy. 
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Modern relativism, on the other hand, although it tends to become skeptical, was 
originally a reaction against the latter. To dispell the doubt that Hume (1964) had 
suggested about the validity of universal synthetic judgments , Kant (1978) proposed 
that we should understand them as coming not from the apprehension of the real nature 
of things, but from the constitution of our minds. Kant argued that experience has a 
mental factor, hitherto neglected, that actually has a critical importance: it is responsible 
for space, time, categories and all forms of synthesis. It is the formal element that comes 
from the structure of the mind itself that organizes knowledge and makes it what it is. 
Hume was wrong to assume that knowledge is an attempt to copy reality. Not so. The 
world, as we know it, the world of experience, depends essentially on the human mind, 
from which derives unity, order and form. The obvious objection to such relativism is 
the thing-in-itself, which is not and can never be an object of knowledge. We were thus 
locked into a world of appearances, whose nature is constituted by our minds. We can 
never know what is Reality itself. Yet that is precisely what, according to Kant, we want 
to know. The fascination of Kant's philosophy lies in the fact that it gave full value to 
the activity, as opposed to the passivity or receptivity of the mind, but the unknowable 
Ding-an-sich was an abomination,  a fatal inconsistency with its apparent power to 
solve the problem of human knowledge. It must be eliminated at all costs, and the 
easiest way to do this is to nip it in the bud, to abolish it, leaving us with a knowable 
Reality because Reality and knowledge are one thing, and in this task, the mind, human 
or absolute, plays a definitive role. The relativity of Reality, which took the place of the 
reality of knowledge, has been designed in various ways. 
Occasionally, as in the case of Fichte and Hegel (1948), nature is opposed to the mind 
or spirit as two sides of the same thing: intelligence, or will, or even of the unconscious 
mind. At other times, Reality is conceived as an organic whole that somehow is 
manifested in finite centers of experience, seeking to reproduce in themselves Reality as 
it is. Unfortunately, they fail so that what they say, even being contradictory, must 
somehow asking to be accepted as true. They are as true as other truths in the sense that 
they aim to express Reality, but must be subject to an infinite reinterpretation before 
they become identical with that Reality to which they refer. 
The modern absolutist, realizing the inadequacy of this position, has returned some 
independence to the physical order, which does not depend for its existence on my 
perception, but it depends on my perception with regard to the qualities and 
relationships we found in it. In other words, the "who" of the real world depends on our 
perceptual organs. Or that reality, before it is known, is merely raw material, while what 
we call a "thing" or object of knowledge, is raw materials processed by an appropriate 
mental process that gives it the attributes of spatiality and the like. Knowing, therefore, 
is to "induce the form of knowledge on the subject." 
The relativity of Reality conceived this way, really means a return to Kant's position, 
except that instead of the thing-in-itself, with its character and unknowable properties, 
then is a kind of raw material, without qualities, attributes, or determinations, and 
consequently, as unknowable as the thing-in-itself, unknowable now because there is 
nothing to know. In this context, modern idealism paired with pragmatism and 
humanism, insists that Reality must be epistemologically seen as a raw material that is 
totally devoid of properties and totally indeterminate. The difference between the two 
views lies in that, for the idealist, the form is imposed on the subject by the very act by 
which we know it, while for the pragmatists, this does not happen until after a long 
philosophical experimental process. 
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In his "Essais sur la connaissance" (Essay on knowledge) M. Fonsegrive (1909) 
discussed at length the issue of relativism, and in his opinion we must grant in a sense 
that knowledge is relative to our faculties. But, although he makes this concession 
universally, in fact his own theory is that only our knowledge of corporeal objects is 
what is considered strictly relative. We can know other minds as they are because we 
ourselves are thinking beings, and the internal manifestation of our mentality and that of 
others are of a similar nature. But "we know the essence of things, and the essence of 
our relationship with things. Among the laws of nature themselves, us know less than we 
do of our dealings with nature." “What we know, is known as the subject." The main 
argument on which this relativism rests is basically the same as used by Berkeley in his 
famous "Dialogue between Hylas and Filonous" (Stoneham, T., 2002). Hence, what we 
know is never the subject as it is in itself, but only in terms of our knowledge of it. 
Obviously, the above argument is valid if the notions of "being in itself" and "being 
known as" are mutually exclusive, but this is not the way it is conceived by the realist or 
anti-relativist. Being in-itself merely means being as it exists, although it is not known. 
This means that the nature and existence of being is prior to our knowledge of it (a fact 
that Fonsegrive holds firmly), and does not mean that being, as it exists, can not be 
known. The Fonsegrive argument (1909) proves nothing against the opinion which 
states that the real nature of the object is knowable if the thing, in the abstract, is not the 
thing that exists that is known, in concrete, there is no reason not to actually say that 
what is existing in nature can be known, or, in other words, that it can not be known as 
it is. 
The argument that relativists to try to prove the relativity of Reality is precisely similar 
to the above: We can not think about real things, except insofar as they are objects of 
experience, from which it follows that their reality depends on your relationship with 
mind. This argument is patently false. All that it proves is that things should be, or else 
become objects of experience in order to be known by the mind. But no proof that 
things must, by their very nature, be objects of experience. Unless Reality is intelligible 
and can fall within experience, it can not become an object of thought. In no other way 
can the possibility of knowing the thing  assume its "connection to the mind." Definitely 
to know something is to bring it into the field of consciousness, but it just continues to 
be conceivable that, things should be able to become objects of consciousness.  
Psychological considerations compel us to admit that Reality, when experienced, 
transformed, or better, is reproduced as a psychic fact, but we cannot conclude that 
reality itself, the reality that is the object of experience and which refers to our 
experience as something external to itself, necessarily a psychic fact. Experience or 
perception obviously are conditions without which we cannot think anything about 
things, much less think about them as existing, but that in no way means that experience 
and perception are conditions that things may exist. When we think, we do not 
ordinarily think of things as objects of experience, but simply as "things", real or 
imagined. And when we name the properties of the things, we think of them as 
belonging to things and not superinduced by our minds. However, our natural way of 
thinking could be wrong. Even granting that what "appears" is the Reality, appearances 
can be false. They may be fully or partially due to our minds and, consequently, did not 
reveal the nature of Reality, but rather their relationship with us-as-learners, and with 
our faculties and our organs. 
Most of the arguments presented in support of this theory are based on psychology, and 
while psychology makes responsible judgments, the arguments are far from conclusive. 
We are invited to believe that abstraction and generalization are subjective processes 
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involved in every act of knowledge, essentially modifying its contents. But abstraction 
is not a forgery, unless we assume that we are considering the abstract as if it exists in 
the concrete, that is, that there is not a connection with, and mutual dependence of other 
things, that are isolated and independent, as we understood it. 
Nor is generalization false, unless we assume, without proof, that there really are 
individuals to whom our concept potentially applies. In a word, neither these nor any 
other of the subjective processes and ways of thinking destroys the validity of 
knowledge if we distinguish, as we should, that which is purely formal and subjective, 
of what belongs to the objective content and what refers to the actual order of causes 
and purposes. 
Another argument is derived from the alleged relativity of sensation, from which all 
knowledge is derived in the scholastic theory of knowledge. It is said that the quality of 
sensation is largely determined by the character of our nervous system and, in 
particular, by the receptors of our different senses. 
 
1) First, it is at least probable, however, that the quality of sensation is determined 
by the stimulus, and in any case, the objection is unnecessary because the 
argument does not refer us to our sense of objects as such, but as qualities that 
ignore nature, although we know that our senses may differ in varying degrees. 
Even if we should grant that the feeling is on our specialized organs of sense, we 
can not conclude in any way that the knowledge gained by the sense involves a 
subjective determination. 
2) Second, the sense data give us not only qualitative differences, but also spatial 
forms and magnitudes, distance, motion, speed, direction, and these data with 
quantitative data as in mathematics and physical science. 
3) Third, sensory data, that are partly subjective, have an objective cause as a 
condition. Consequently, a theory that explains sense data , successfully 
assigned conditions that are no less real than the purposes to which they give 
rise, at least partially. 
4) Finally, if knowledge is really relative in the sense explained above, although it 
may satisfy our practical efforts, it can never satisfy the speculative. The goal of 
the speculative research is knowing Reality as it is. But knowledge, if it was 
only for appearances, would have no real meaning, and would be conceived as a 
kind of a priori idealism, neither would it have a purpose. 
 
Kantian commonly taught that relationship is the category of categories. Matter and 
motion "consist of relationships." In fact, reality as we know it is nothing more than a 
set of relationships because "the nature of the mind is such that no knowledge can be 
acquired or expressed, and consequently no real existence can be conceived if not to 
through a system of relations" (Renouvier, 1891). 
This form of relativism can be called objective, to distinguish it from the relativism we 
have discussed above, and which, in fact, it is usually combined. This is, first, a theory 
of the nature of knowledge, but also a metaphysical knowledge to identify with Reality. 
Such a view is a theory of the nature of the relationship and is very different from that 
of the Scholastics. For the latter, the relationship requires: 
1) A subject to which it belongs. 
2) Something special in the subject to explain what it proclaims. 
3) A term, other than itself, to which it relates. 
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A relationship, in other words, according to modern thinking, presupposes its "terms". 
There is a mysterious and invisible link that somehow unites two aspects of one thing 
and makes them one. A relationship can be mutual, but if so, there are actually two 
relationships (e.g., Paternity and filiation) belonging to different subjects, or, if the 
same, arises from different principles. It is true that in science, as in other things, we 
learn a relationship without being able to discover the nature of the relationship linking 
entities. We know, for example, the pressure and temperature vary proportionately in a 
given mass of gas whose volume is kept constant, not knowing with certainty the final 
nature of the pressure and temperature. But we do know something about them. We 
know they exist, that each of them has a peculiar nature, and it is because of this nature 
that there is this relationship between them. We cannot know a relationship without 
knowing some of the things it relates, since the relationship presupposes its "terms". 
Therefore, the universe cannot consist of relationships, but it must be composed of 
interrelated things. 
 
3. REALITY AND FORMAL LANGUAGES  
 
Referring to formal languages, mathematicians seem reluctant to refer to the " concepts 
existing behind the symbols" as meaningless, or to claim that mathematical entities are 
non-existent, and this reluctance is sufficiently justified because of the pejorative nature 
of such terminology. The ontological status of mathematical entities, as matter of 
paradox, has a long history of philosophical debates, perhaps because of their close 
relationship to the problem of universals.  
 
3.1. The Spinozian thought  
As with Hobbes and Descartes, Spinoza is impressed with mathematics as a kind of 
knowledge - because of the certainty of its proofs and demonstrations. More than any 
other thinker we have seen, however, Spinoza carries to the furthest extreme the 
peculiarly modern effort to establish a complete philosophy in which mathematics is not 
simply a part (as with Plato): rather, this philosophy is one that is entirely subsumed 
under the mathematical model. This means that Spinoza's assumptions at the 
outset preclude what we have seen to be a considerable problem in the modern period - 
especially with Hobbes and Descartes. That is, especially with Descartes, who 
recognizes a considerable split between the world of sense-knowledge and the 
mathematical dimensions of mind, the problem we are left facing is one of explaining or 
justifying the relation between pure mathematics and the sensory world. Spinoza 
simply assumes that reality is co-extensive with the world of mathematical entities and 
relations. That is, there simply is no other reality than reality as mathematically 
described: anything which presents itself as "reality" - but which is not mathematically 
"capturable" - is simply illusion. 
 
3.2. Mathematical platonism 
For Platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes 
objects which aren't part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical 
sciences. Mathematical Platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If it were 
true, it would put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the 
physical. Mathematical platonism, if true, would also put great pressure on many 
naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical 
knowledge. Mathematical Platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge 
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of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important 
discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to 
accommodate. Although these philosophical consequences are not unique 
to mathematical Platonism, this particular form of Platonism is unusually well suited to 
support such consequences. For mathematics is a remarkably successful discipline, both 
in its own right and as a tool for other sciences. So if philosophical analysis reveals 
mathematics to have some strange and surprising consequences, it would be unattractive 
simply to reject mathematics. A form of Platonism based on a discipline whose 
scientific credentials are less impressive than those of mathematics would not be in this 
fortunate situation. Working realism is the methodological view that mathematics 
should be practiced as ifPplatonism was true (Bernays 1935, Shapiro 1997). This 
requires some explanation. In debates about the foundations of mathematics Platonism 
has often been used to defend certain mathematical methods, such as the following: 
1) Classical first-order (or stronger) languages whose singular terms and quantifiers 
appear to be referring to and ranging over mathematical objects.  
2) Classical rather than intuitionistic logic. 
3) Non-constructive methods (such as non-constructive existence proofs) and non-
constructive axioms (such as the Axiom of Choice). 
4) Impredicative definitions.  
5) Hilbertian optimism, that is, the belief that every mathematical problem is in 
principle solvable.  
According to working realism, these and other classical methods are acceptable and 
available in all mathematical reasoning. We assume that mathematical Platonism is true. 
Then clearly the language of mathematics ought to be as described in (1). Secondly, 
provided it is legitimate to reason classically about any independently existing part of 
reality, (2) would also follow. Thirdly, since Platonism ensures that mathematics is 
discovered rather than invented, there would be no need for mathematicians to restrict 
themselves to constructive methods and axioms, which establishes (3). Fourth, there is a 
powerful and influential argument due to Gödel that impredicative definitions are 
legitimate whenever the objects being defined exist independently of our definitions. If 
this is correct, then (4) would follow. Finally, if mathematics is about some 
independently existing reality, then every mathematical problem has a unique and 
determinate answer, which provides at least some motivation for Hilbertian optimism. 
By the standards of philosophy, Abstractness has remained relatively uncontroversial. 
Among the few philosophers to have challenged it are Maddy (1990) (concerning 
impure sets (Nescolarde-Selva et al. 2012a,b; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 
2013b; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013c; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-
Selva,  2013) and Bigelow (1988) (concerning sets and various kinds of numbers). It is 
a plausible prima facie constraint on any philosophical interpretation of mathematical 
practice that it should avoid ascribing to mathematics any features which would render 
actual mathematical practice misguided or inadequate. This constraint makes it hard to 
deny that the objects of pure mathematics are abstract. For if these objects had 
spatiotemporal locations, then actual mathematical practice would be misguided and 
inadequate, since pure mathematicians ought then to take an interest in the locations of 
their objects, just as physicists take an interest in the locations of theirs. The fact that 
pure mathematicians take no interest in this question suggests that their objects are 
abstract. 
 
3.3. The Gödelian thought 
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Gödel strongly stated his own position (Gödel, K, 1934, 1964a,b): 
 
1) Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived as real objects, namely: 
a) Classes as "pluralities of things" or as structures which consist of a 
plurality of things. 
b) Concepts as the properties and relations of things that exist 
independently of our definitions and constructions. 
2) It seems that the assumption of such objects really is as legitimate as the 
assumption of physical bodies and there is enough reason to believe in their 
existence. There is the same sense necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of 
mathematics as well as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of 
our sense perceptions and in both cases it is impossible to interpret the 
propositions. 
 
These paragraphs should be tested extensively and formulated carefully because they 
contain subtle but crucial distinctions. It must be admitted that there is an important 
difference between Gödel's statement that "Classes and concepts may, however, also be 
conceived as real objects" and "classes and objects are real objects." If it were a 
question of just how classes and concepts have been designed, then the fact of 
employing "thing" in the language of mathematics could be considered as an extension 
of our everyday expected discourse, then one would have a fit, and a heuristically 
valuable exposure method, that is perhaps devoid of ontological presupposition. Even if 
one grants that we have "something of a perception" of mathematical objects, it is 
difficult to imagine what would be a phenomenological exposition of mathematics, or if 
it is at all possible. Thus the choice of language does not seem justifiable in 
epistemological priority areas, whereas Gödel apparently discovered that in the case of 
sensory perceptions, sense data are epistemologically prior to physical objects, the latter 
being a necessary theoretical assumption. 
Gödel makes a strong comparison between "the question of the objective existence of 
the objects of mathematical intuition" and the "question of the objective existence of the 
external world" which he considers to be "an exact replica". We are inclined to believe 
that this comparison does not respond to the fact that mathematics is not universally 
understood in the same way that the physical world which is "accessible" to virtually 
everyone. Applying "mathematical intuition" in this way tends to establish that the 
mathematician is a "visionary", which is not precisely Gödel’s intention , because we 
like to believe that "mathematical truths" are as accessible as the "physical truths" i.e., 
common physical objects. However, if what Gödel says is that "physical intuition" is the 
intuition of physical things, the comparison is more accurate, since physical entities are 
perhaps as equally "abstract" as those of mathematics. Arguments involving "our 
knowledge of the external world" are mostly at the level of "furniture". 
Similar difficulties exist in the problem of mathematical objects and the problem of 
physical objects. In both cases, our everyday discourse is a "language of the thing." 
Although the question of our perception of physical objects has centered around the 
discussion of sensory data, it is difficult to build a similar entity for mathematics.Gödel, 
in his analysis of Russell’s comparisons between "axioms of mathematical logic and the 
laws of nature and logical evidence to sensory perception" said arithmetic is "elemental 
and indisputable evidence that compares more appropriately to sensory perception. " 
However this does not answer the question of how we "perceive" arithmetical truths. 
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For the manipulation of symbols, this reduces in some way to the perception of physical 
objects, i.e., the symbols themselves. 
The "logical evidence" or "math data" can be seen as a test of numerical computations, 
and reasoning from tables and diagrams and as follows: 
 
1) The theorems of number theory are often generalizations of the "observation" of 
the calculations. Statements about prime numbers and multiple numbers can be 
considered as generalizations (laws) obtained from the convention that 7 is a 
prime, and 6 is a multiple, etc. Euclid's Theorem, claiming the infinity of prime 
numbers, can be "verified" by the calculation as indicated above. The axioms of 
arithmetic allow us to demonstrate this assertion in general, to make it possible 
for these sensory perceptions to be deduced. For any given prime number, we 
have always been able to obtain one more. 
2) Tables and diagrams are shown to be the heuristically valuable in algebra and 
geometry. Historically, geometry is the science of measuring physical objects. 
Tables can be used to list the elements of a group and the results of a particular 
composition to "verify" the theorems of group theory, such as "counting" the 
number of its subgroups. Such tables are an algebraic aspect of the "experiments 
with physical objects." 
3) The issue of computability is down to the ability to perform specific operations 
on the theoretical calculating machines, i.e., the task of representation "physical 
objects": algorithms are frequently called calculations. This name originates 
from calculi (small pieces of limestone) that the Romans used for the 
calculations. 
4) Many problems to do with "large cardinality" stem from the observation that 
certain infinite cardinal family have particular properties, and the question is 
about the existence of other (usually non-enumerable). 
5) Those propositions which, if true, are extremely strong axioms of infinity.... 
Contradicting Mahlo axioms, the truth (or consistency) of these axioms are an 
immediate consequence of the basic intuitions underlying abstract theory of sets. 
However, the new axioms are based on fairly strong arguments from analogy, 
such as the fact implied by the existence of Stone's representation theorem of 
Boolean algebras concerning operations with many elements. 
 
If it is credible to "perceive" or "experience" calculations examining mathematical 
objects and constructions, then  one is in a position to offer an interpretation of Gödel’s 
idea of 'real'. Gödel stated "I believe that mathematical objects exist independently of 
our building and our having an intuition of them individually...". If mathematical 
objects were finite in number, "an intuition of them individually could be" possible. But 
this is not even possible for integers. For example, there is a finite and effective 
procedure by which we can test to see if an integer is prime. Although it is possible in 
principle to test any given integer (not taking into account the amount of time and 
material required due to the current state of technology), it is impossible to test all 
integers. When you accept Euclid's theorem, you must accept the existence of a prime 
number according to Euclid’s Theorem, not because it has been proven1. 
                                                          
1 Euclid offered the following proof published in his work Elements (Book IX, Proposition 20) and 
paraphrased here. Take any finite list of prime numbers p1, p2, ..., pn. It will be shown that at least one 
additional prime number exists that is not in this list. Let P be the product of all the prime numbers in the 
list: P = p1p2...pn. Let q = P + 1. Then, q is either prime or not: 
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So we must recognize the existence of mathematical objects that we are unable to 
examine (experience), even if the domain is restricted to infinite potential objects. Then 
the "phenomenalist" mathematician, who supports mathematical truths to the extent that 
they are verifiable, to examine calculations and constructions, shall be required to place 
a limit on the size of finite structures depending on the technological ability to 
scrutinize such objects. However, it may be objected that the "phenomenalists" 
mathematicians could accept these truths, which are theoretically "testable" by 
evidence, and cannot reject the potentially infinite need. Then they appear as 
"theoretically verifiable", which would inevitably reduce some form of "normative 
behavior" of mathematical objects, and the problem reappears in a different form. 
Let us realize that Gödel distinguishes the existence of different knowable objects: 
discussing the third form of Vicious Circle Principle, he indicated that mathematical 
objects can be assumed to exist independently of our constructions, and the third form 
of the principle is not violated if the means are presumed to assume existence and not 
cognition. This tends to corroborate our identification of "experiential knowledge" with 
"examining constructions and calculations." Although "phenomenalism" mathematical 
extends to allow potential infinity, and allows classical analysis, because it is 
unreasonable to maintain that a whole is uncountable and "in principle subject to 
question." 
Taking the classical analysis as a criterion for "a satisfactory mathematical system", we 
are forced to acknowledge the existence of mathematical objects, which we have no 
way, even from the beginning, to examine. Thus, mathematical objects exist 
independently of experience, as opposed to being phenomenal or apparent, and are 
therefore real. That is, we replace "regardless of our building and our having an 
intuition of his individuality" to "independently of experience." 
With the real interpretation given above, Reality is nothing more than a system of real 
objects. For a system of real objects, we mean that the objects of mathematics are 
governed by regularities. Axioms are mathematical objects as physical laws are to 
physical objects. One argument in favor of this view is the fact that no mythological 
allusion is in any of the writings of Gödel. Gödel seems to be saying that mathematical 
objects are so specific, so stable, and so well educated as physical objects, and that the 
axioms actually govern their behavior. In this respect, mathematical objects are neither 
illusory nor ephemeral, not any invention or any allegory. They are real. It can be seen, 
however, that one aspect of Gödel use of existence, its relationship to the criterion of 
intimate clarity, allows a comparison to their use by other philosophers, Descartes and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a) If q is prime then there is at least one more prime than is listed. 
b) If q is not prime then some prime factor p divides q. If this factor p were on our list, then it would 
divide P (since P is the product of every number on the list); but as we know, p divides into P + 1 = q. 
If p divides into P and q then p would have to divide into the difference of the two numbers, which is 
(P + 1) − P or just 1. But no prime number divides 1 so there would be a contradiction, and therefore it 
cannot be on the list. This means at least one more prime number exists beyond those in the list. This 
proves that for every finite list of prime numbers, there is a prime number not on the list. Therefore, there 
must be infinitely many prime numbers. It is often erroneously reported that Euclid proved this result 
by contradiction, beginning with the assumption that the set initially considered contains all prime 
numbers, or that it contains precisely the n smallest primes, rather than any arbitrary finite set of 
primes. Although the proof as a whole is not by contradiction, in that it does not begin by assuming that 
only a finite number of primes exist, there is a proof by contradiction within it: that is the proof that none 
of the initially considered primes can divide into the number identified above. 
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Hume in particular. Gödel stated that he "only requires general math concepts should 
possess sufficiently clear value for us to recognize their authenticity and the truth of the 
axioms about them ....".  Here we find a subtle but important distinction between 
intuition and clarity. We have an intuition that what can be said is clear. The concepts, 
for example of infinite totalities may be clear, however, our intuition of these entities 
may be quite weak. For example our intuition of elementary arithmetic and logic allows 
us to formalize such theories with strong enough convictions and general acceptance. 
Our intuition of large numbers in cardinal arithmetic, and the logic exists about them is 
much weaker. No one can say that these arguments are immediate. However, most 
mathematicians would agree that these concepts are unclear, although it is something 
basic or primitive. For us to be able to distinguish two different powers of infinity, is 
evidence for the belief that the Dower concept of infinite is clear. 
Descartes (1960) discusses the concept of a triangle in a manner remarkably similar to 
the position held by Gödel that mathematical entities are not mind-dependent. 
Descartes's commentary on the case of a triangle "maybe there can be no figure outside 
my thought anywhere in the world " raises a problem in that some critis seem to 
misunderstand Gödel. Gödel is indicating that there is an analogy between the existence 
of mathematical objects and the existence of physical objects. He never claimed them to 
be physical objects, or that they existed in space and certainly not in any "mythical"sky. 
How can they be then? Perhaps in the sense of David  Hume (1964): 
 
'Twill not be surprizing after this, if I deliver a maxim, which is 
condemn'd by several metaphysicians, and is esteem’s contrary to the 
most certain principles of human reason. This maxim is that an object 
may exist, and yet be no where:  and I assert, that this is not only 
possible, but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this 
manner. 
 
The computability or physical interpretations are of secondary importance. It depends if 
it is understood in the sense of actual real physical existence (in space and time), and 
then mathematical objects are not real. Subsequently factual reality and mathematical 
reality are often considered synonymous, and if so it can be a source of confusion. 
Another aspect of existence in mathematical contexts that should not be confused with 
"the existence in terms of clarity", is existence in the sense of consistency. 
Mathematicians often wonder if there are certain objects for which properties are 
specified. In the context of the discussion, it is clear that the question being asked is 
whether the assumption of the existence of such objects is consistent with other axioms 
that have been alleged, and unfortunately, they are not always specified. 
One might ask whether Gödel believed that mathematical truths are "eternal" since he 
thought that mathematical objects exist "independently" of the experience. Can one not 
see the inconsistency between his idea of mathematical existence and the idea that 
mathematical truths are eternal. We can resist any effort to read "mythology" in their 
thinking about the existence of mathematical objects. Gödel's realism, then, can be seen 
as a form of scientific realism without mythological or ontological commitments. So 
your ideas agree with Carnap (1942, 1964, 1967), and are a fact that indicating his 
belonging to the Vienna Circle. 
Ontological questions arise in considering mathematical objects as real objects, 
"believing in its existence" represents an area of contention among many philosophers 
who, for the most part, agree on the methods and content of mathematics. These critics 
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do not dispute the clarity or the need for a proper development of language, as it was 
understood by Gödel, but can not agree with the ontological status of mathematical 
objects. Arguably the viewpoint that the content and mathematics methods are crucial, 
however, ontology is secondary or should be ignored completely. Therefore, it is 
considered that these disagreements do not make any changes to the content or 
mathematical methods, because they are seen as linguistic or verbal disputes, arguments 
over words and not things. 
Gödel's realism, while similar to that of Locke and Leibniz, "forces us to consider 
axioms as true." This answers a question, nor touched by neither Locke nor Leibniz, 
why choose a system or a set of axioms, and not another with the implication that the 
choice of a mathematical system is not arbitrary. 
 
3.4. Benacerraf’s thought 
Although Benacerraf (1965) focuses on arithmetic, the objection naturally generalizes to 
most pure mathematical objects. Benacerraf opens by defending what is now known as 
a structuralist view of natural numbers, according to which natural numbers have no 
properties other than those they have in virtue of being positions in an ω-sequence. For 
instance, there is nothing more to being the number 3 than having certain 
intrastructurally defined relational properties, such as succeeding 2, being half of 6, and 
being prime. No matter how hard we study arithmetic and set theory, we will never 
know whether 3 is identical with the fourth von Neumann ordinal, or with the 
corresponding Zermelo ordinal, or perhaps, as Frege suggested, with the class of all 
three-membered classes (in some system that allows such classes to exist)2. Benacerraf 
now draws the following conclusion: Therefore, numbers are not objects at all, because 
in giving the properties …of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure—
and the distinction lies in the fact that the “elements” of the structure have no properties 
other than those relating them to other “elements” of the same structure. (Benacerraf 
1965) 
In other words, Benacerraf claims that there can be no objects which have nothing but 
structural properties. All objects must have some non-structural properties as well. Both 
of the steps of Benacerraf's argument are controversial. The first step—that natural 
numbers have only structural properties—has recently been defended by a variety of 
mathematical structuralists. But this step is denied by logicists and neo-logicists, who 
claim that the natural numbers are intrinsically tied to the cardinalities of the collections 
that they number. And the second step—that there can be no objects with only structural 
properties—is explicitly rejected by all of the structuralists who defend the first step.  
 
4. REALITY AND NATURAL LENGUAGES 
 
There are different kinds of objects, which are characterized by different mental acts by 
which objects are perceived in their environment (Meinong, 1904). The objects of 
perception are different from those of thought but the latter are no less "objective" than 
the previous ones: they are "apprehended" by thought, but do not consist of it. 
Meanings and judgments are examples of this second type of object: in Meinong's 
terminology, they "hold together" (bestehen), while individual beings and qualities 
"exist". In this sense, the objects of thought can be real without existing in the technical 
                                                          
2 What the number 3 means depends on the definition of a number. 
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sense given by Meinong, and mathematical objects are of this kind. An intellectual 
inquiry is not linked to the empirical existence of objects, no existential presupposition 
is needed for their objects to be and be made "real" in an exactly specific sense. The 
object as such is indifferent to the nature of existence. 
Analysis is needed of how speaking a language can be used in a given domain of 
objects. The first condition is (Agazzi, 1992) that these objects are there, and this is 
done through an act of speech, and through the presence of these objects in the subject's 
thinking. Phenomenological truth, the phenomenological situation such that an object 
just by being there, gives the subject an irrefutable and perhaps the only irrefutable 
witness of itself. This presence is the phenomenological situation covering this term 
through all possible ways to be present, and to suspend any judgment about the 
ontological status of what is present. Phenomenological truth has the following 
characteristics: 
1) It is unstable, because it enables the subject to remain within the Kingdom of the 
Truth when he leaves the immediate presence of being. 
2) It is private, because of the presence of certain objects only to the individual and 
these objects are really and instantly present. 
It is possible to say (Agazzi, 1992) that the fundamental function of language is to 
overcome these limitations, enabling the subject to "preserve" the truth somehow 
beyond the moment of its immediacy and making it intersubjective. Thus, the 
characteristic of truth that is intrinsic to the phenomenological situation is transferred to 
language, as demonstrated by the fact that the common use of the term "true" referring 
to propositions of a language. And when is attributed primarily it denotes a state of the 
objects which are present phenomenologically. But the language itself can enter the 
field of presence, and this, in two respects: 
 
a) It is present with its structures and forms. 
 
b) It is "denotant", that is, regarding the presence of another sector. 
The referential position is the position of the phenomenological presence of the object. 
And the absolute truth of a sentence is the coincidence with the situation of the 
phenomenological presence. Language should have tools able to retain the presence of 
objects even if they are really there. And these tools are the meanings that appear to be 
drawn from the referential situation, but not coincident with it, although they may even 
stay out of this situation. Meanings or are only partially understandings and "faithful" 
with respect to any particular phenomenological presence or what a referential situation 
might indicate. The concept "man" does not contain all the details of every single man 
could be denoted through it, but it is not doing that to denote men who do not share all 
the details. 
Concepts are mental entities and, as such, are private. For collective evolution should be 
associated with the expressions of a language. This step determines the formal level, 
defined here as the fulfillment of conditions for explanation without ambiguity, so that 
the correct application of these conditions should enable men to understand other 
"meanings" using certain expressions. This phase entails the creation of a complex 
structure, since the small size of the present phenomenological analyzes, not only 
through a complex network of mutually interwoven meanings, but the language itself 
must somehow reproduce the complexity of this meaning -structure so that it can make 
a statement. This is the reason why language or semantics or the ability to convey 
meaning, necessarily presupposes the possession of a certain syntactic structure. On the 
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other hand we have a syntactic structure, with different components which can be seen 
as having the ability to convey meaning (Carnap, 1942, 1964, 1967; Chomsky, 1963, 
1965, 1969) in a way analogous to the meanings that are able to denote referents. The 
significant propositions also denote phenomenological presence and say they are true, 
and an important part of the syntax is the exploration of the domain structure of "true 
statements". 
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 2001) embodies an individualistic, 
universalistic and atomistic of knowledge and the world. Anything that can be thought 
can be said, so that the limits of language are the limits of thought (Giddens, 1976). 
Wittgenstein set out to build the unique language of a universal science, an attempt 
based on the relation of isomorphism between words in a sentence and the world objects 
it designates, that is, on a label or nominal theory of language that really has dominated 
Western civilization since Plato. This theory holds that words are tags or labels attached 
to objects in the world. Wittgenstein’s second theory is based on a theory of language as 
well, somehow, a theory encoded in society (Gellner, 1998): Humanity lives in cultural 
communities, attached to forms of self-legitimized life that can only be described, not 
justified or explained, because in themselves they constitute the endpoint of any 
validation. When trying to find transcultural or extracultural reasons to the customs, the 
type of error emerges that has generated all philosophy. Wittgenstein denies the 
possibility of finding outside linguistic practice what these cultural forms govern, and 
introduces, the concept of language game (Wittenstein, 1988a). Wittgenstein assumes 
that naming objects in the world (nominal or referential function of language) is just one 
of many things that can be done with language. We name things and we can refer to 
them in speech, as if the act of naming already were given when we speak. Language 
games are nothing other than different uses of language depending on the context in 
which it is used, so there are as many language games as various uses of it. They refer 
to the fact that "speaking the language" is part of an activity or a form of life 
(Wittgenstein, 1988b), whereby when language games change concepts change and, 
with them, the connnotative significances of lexemes. In this context, "following a rule" 
does not mean merely to know and apply it mechanically, because understanding the 
rule is essential for its proper application in the appropriate contexts, as well as in new 
situations (Ulin,  1990). Winch (1964, 1990) considered that if reality is constituted 
through language games, it may be concluded that our sense of reality is the result of a 
social construction of intersubjective character from conventional discourse in a 
language community. The notions of reality and rationality are relative to the conceptual 
framework of a community. It is not reality that gives meaning to the language. The real 
and the unreal are displayed in what language has. Both the distinction between real and 
unreal as well as the concept of correspondence with reality belong to our language. 
According to this hypothesis, unrelated linguistic communities, may have 
incommensurable or mutually intelligible worldviews, and may be therefore 
incomparable. Asking if reality is intelligible involves questioning the relationship 
between thought and reality. Considering the nature of thought leads us to consider the 
nature of language. Thus the question of the intelligibility of reality is inextricably 
linked to this other question: how to connect language to reality, what does it mean to 
say something (Winch, 1990). Rationality is thus not simply the informal logic of life a 
linguistic community shares within a specific cultural tradition. 
But a language (formal or otherwise) on the one hand says "more" and on the other 
"less" about what is true of intentional or related models (Agazzi, 1992). This means 
that no language can fully and properly express phenomenological presence. The 
po
st-
pri
nt 
Co
rre
sp
on
din
g a
uth
or:
 jo
su
e.s
e v
a@
ua
.es
 
16 
 
linguistic description of the subject is cheating with respect to what is present inhis 
thought. Moreover, a party receiving a Subject’s linguistic communication will interpret 
to denote a presence for him, an added additional failure. This is equivalent to saying 
that absolute truth is not intersubjective. Another limitation is that it can cover the 
whole domain of true propositions that are expressible in language. 
 
Semantic Incompleteness Principle (J. Nescolarde-Selva, 2010; J.L. Usó-Domènech and 
J. Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; J. Nescolarde-Selva and J.L. Usó-Domènech, 2013b): It is 
not possible to totally characterize a structure of objects or processes, through a 
language (formal or not), or to totally even dominate a portion of "truth" that this 
language can express about these objects or processes through its deductive operation.   
 
Consequences: 
 
1) There is an inadequacy of the semantic dimension relative to the benchmark or 
phenomenological situation. 
2) There is a mismatch of the dimension in relation to the reference syntactical 
semantics. 
 
Language is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being, then? We can and 
we cannot. But that we cannot completely speak about it, it is not a reason to stop 
speaking about it (Wittgenstein, 1953), because we can incompletely represent its 
completeness We would not be able to speak about anything, because languages are 
incomplete. Language is used inside a context. Depending of this context, the language 
will be different. The Semantic Incompleteness Principle is a consequence of Gödel's famous 
theorem (1931) and NWET (Non Wished Effects Theorem;  J. Nescolarde-Selva, 2010; J.L. 
Usó-Domènech and J. Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). 
Beings do not have an intrinsic meaning and they only transform themselves into signs 
when we invest them with meaning. The signs are significant units that take form from 
words, images, sounds, gestures and objects, studied within a system of semiotic signs, 
like means or code.   
 
Definition 1: The sign is the unit able to transmit representative contents, that is to say, 
it is a being that is named a significant, that is perceived by the senses, and that in the 
communicative process carryies information for the Subject.  
 
In any process, we can distinguish between having a significant like an inherent 
property, and having a significance like it is related to the rest of processes of the 
Reality, that the Subject considers as a system. (Usó-Domènech, J.L., J. Mateu. 2004; 
Nescolarde-Selva, J.A., 2010; Usó-Doménech, J.L and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012; 
Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a.b)  
 
Definition 2: The existence of information is independent of the existence of a Subject 
able to decode the message. This objective information is termed significant S. 
 
Definition 3: The information in a message acquires meaning if a Subject decodes the 
message. This subjective information is termed significance s. 
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Let B be a Belief system and L be a language both forming a doxical filter3.   
 
Definition 4: Each significance s is function of the components of a doxical filter, that 
is to say, the Belief system B and its associated language L, so that s=f(B, L). This 
function f we will call the significance function.   
 
Therefore, significant S is an ontic property, considering that the significance s will be 
part of a system of meaning. A significant is absolute and infinite, significance is 
relative and finite. The significant comes from absolute being and significance generates 
the relative being. The significant is interpreted as the material or physical form of the 
sign and is something that can be caught (perception) by some of the traditional senses 
of the human being.  The significance, on the other hand is a mental construction. In our 
approach, the significant has a veritative value equal to 1, that is to say, ( ) 1=Sv , 
whereas the significance has as veritative value a real number positive ( )sv , between 0 
and 1, where 0 corresponds to absolute ignorance of significant (therefore of the 
process) and 1 to absolute understanding, that is to say,. V(S) = v(s) 
The subject receives two types of semiotic stimuli:  
 
a) Significant of his process or being.  
b) The significant of the transmitted semiotic stimulus or significant of the 
significance.   
 
This fact forces us to distinguish two types of significant:   
 
Definition 5: The A-significant (A-S) or significant of first order, is the significant that 
is inherent to beings, processes or phenomena of the referring context.   
 
Definition 6: The B-significant (B-S), significant of second order or connotation, is the 
significant of significance s.  
 
Connotation B-S has a veritative value v’(B-S) = 1 having simultaneously, a relative 
veritative value or connotative veritative value ( ) [ ]1,0∈sv . That is to say, we received 
solar light rays with significant S and a significance s of the light, Sun, etc, concepts 
with a veritative value ( ) [ ]1,0∈sv , having relative significant (B-S) with a veritative 
value v’(B-S) = 1.  
 
Consequence 1: The significant S or significance s depends entirely on the level in 
which it operates in the analysis. Then, that which is significance in one level of the 
context; it can be significant in another one.  
 
                                                          
3 The significant coming from the sign becomes significance after passing through a filter or sieve, which 
we will call the doxical filter. This filter consists of two essential components:  the language and the 
belief system.   
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Definition 7: Denotation (d-s) is the literal, obvious definition or the common sense of 
the significance of a sign.   
 
Definition 8: Connotation (c-s) are socio-cultural and individual associations, the 
ideologies derived from the belief systems, belonging to the psychology of the Subject, 
and that is the indirect function of the Semiotic Environment (context) in which it is 
immersed.   
 
Both distinctions involve the use of learned codes. The significance s tends to be 
multiplied from an individual sign, until it is equipped with many meanings that go 
beyond that which the sign says now. Different orders from meaning or levels of 
significance exist:   
1) The first order of significance is exactly the one of the denotation (d-s), in 
whichlevel exists a sign consisting of significant S and significance s.  
2) The connotation (c-s) is a significance of second order that uses the denotative 
sign (with significant and significance) as significant, with an additional 
associate significance.   
This distinction considers the connotation (c-s) as a sign that is derived from the 
significant of a denotative sign, so that the denotation takes us to a chain of 
connotations.  Denotation (d-s) is an underlying and primary significance.   
 
Consequence 2: Changes in the form of the significant S can generate different 
connotations (c-s). 
 
Consequence 3: The definition of the connotation (c-s) of a sign is the set of possible 
senses or significances, depending on contexts and Subjects.   
 
Consequence 4: The denotation (d-s) is most stable and apparently verifiable of the 
connotations. 
 
Consequence 5: If the sign is something that interposes, interpreted by the Subject, we 
can affirm that the sign always has a connotation (c-s), and a denotation (d-s) that is 
only the dominant connotation, to be interpreted as the true meaning of a being, process 
or text.  
 
Consequence 6: The relative veritative value of denotation (d-s) or denotative 
veritative value will be v’(d-s) = 1. 
 
We are going to call s the systemic significance that is a denotative significance.  We 
will call ζ the set of significant (signs) of Reality and ζΣ the set of systemic significants, 
that is to say, the parts of signs that have been limited by the Subject when establishing 
the borders of the system, and so that ζΣ ⊂  ζ .  
 
Definition 9: A denotative systemic significance (d-s) sΣ is a function defined in ξ so 
that if ξξ ⊂Σ then ( ) ΣΣΣ ⊆ ξξs  
 
Note 1: A denotative systemic significance (d-significance) is the significance of the 
absolute beings. 
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Note 2: Denotative systemic significance (d-significance) refers to relative beings.  
 
In agreement with Saussure (1984), signs are organized in codes in two ways:  
paradigms and syntagms. These two dimensions are represented like axes of a bi-
dimensional space, where the vertical axis corresponds to paradigm and the horizontal 
axis represents syntagm (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013b) (Fig 1).   
 
Paradigmatic axis
Syntagmatic axis
 
Figure 1: Saussure’s bidimensional space.  
 
In a three-dimensional space, the plane of the paradigm is the one of choice whereas the 
plane of syntagm corresponds to combination.  
 
Definition 10: The syntagm is a combination of ordered significances, which interact , 
forming a totality with sense, in a form of chain of elements often ordered in a linear 
form.  
 
These combinations are constructed within a set of rules and syntactic conventions. 
Syntagmatic relations are the varied forms in which the elements of one system can be 
related. Significance is sintagmatically related as a synchronous form to other 
significant ones at the same level and constituting their context. Syntagms are defined 
as sequential and therefore temporary. They can also represent space relations.  (Figure 
2).   
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c-s1
c-s2 c-s3
c-s4
c-s5
c-s6
c-s9
SYNTAGMATIC 
 
Figure 2: Chain of connotative significances. 
 
*** 
 
Consequence 7: Syntagms are created according to the concatenation of significances 
in paradigmatic sets, chosen according to their property, conventional or required, by 
means of a determined system of rules, like grammar.   
  
Consequence 8: In syntagms, the significance of a syntagmatic unit comes determined 
by means of its relation with other syntagmatic units. Syntagms tend to narrow these 
same significances according to the context.   
 
Consequence 9: In a paradigm, the significance comes determined by the way it is 
different from other significances, in the sense that the paradigms conceive a possible 
world plurality.   
 
Consequence 10: Paradigms expand the Reality, whereas syntagms contracts it.  
 
For Hjelmslev (1968), the study of the comprehension-connotation goes outside of 
linguistic studies: the connotations appear as a content having as a plan of expression 
the set extension-designation of language. The connotations correspond to the upper 
levels of language. The study focuses within the semiotic frame, or a general study of 
signs (not just linguistic signs). 
Let isc −  and jsc − be two connotations. In the common practice of the language, 
proximities have been verified on the syntagmatic axis.  
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Let ρi be a connotative chain and ijsc −  be connotative significances. The code will be 
of the following way (Figure 3):   
 
 
                          ρ1                ρ2                   ρ3                                                               ρn 
PARADIGMATIC 
 
versussc
versussc
versussc
n
1
1
2
1
1
...
−
↓
↓
−
↓
−
      
versussc
versussc
versussc
n
2
2
2
2
1
...
−
↓
↓
−
↓
−
       
...........
...
..........
.........
3
3
2
3
1
versussc
versussc
versussc
n−
↓
↓
−
↓
−
   
n
n
n
n
sc
sc
sc
−
↓
↓
−
↓
−
...
2
1
 
Figure 3: The code. 
 
Rows go on the paradigmatic axis and columns are connotative chains. We are going to 
establish the following rule of substitution: any connotative significance can be replaced 
by another one, belonging or not to the same connotative chain. 
 
That which is identical in n classes of a different object is the cognition or 
understanding of the concept. The definition of a concept that is given in the 
dictionaries of any language is a summary of the understanding of the concept. This is 
the subjective component of a concept, and depends on the semiotic system ( )SΣ that 
exists in the mind of the subject S. 
 
Definition 11: A concept is an analytical definition, an abstraction formed in the mind 
of a subject belonging to a particular semiotic system ( )SΣ .   
 
Definition 12: A formal concept is a concept with formal properties. 
 
Note 3: The concept is a union of denotative and connotative significances (Usó-
Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). 
 
The number of sub-classes contained in n classes assesses the extent or amount as a 
logical concept. It is the objective component of a concept, and depends on the 
ontological system. In linguistic theory, it is the designation (d-s). In a lexical 
designation consisting of the extension of the concept, which in turn constitutes its 
meaning. 
 
Definition 13: Each denotative significance has a comprehension and an extension. 
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Note 4: Comprehensions of the denotative significances are equivalent to the 
connotative significances. 
 
Example 1: "An animal with an internal skeleton and a segmented column" in 5 classes 
- fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals - the comprehension of the concept is 
vertebrate, and the total number of vertebrate species represents extension. 
*** 
We denote denotative significances with italics d-si, d-sj, with normal letters c-si, c-sj 
their comprehensions. Bold denotes d-si, d-sj extensions of concepts, italics and bold 
denote d-si, d-sj propositions. The denotation of set theory is used for extension.  
 
Example 2: The extension of fish being included in the vertebrates, is d-si ⊂ d-sj and 
thereby the extended relationship is expressed both denotative significances.  
*** 
 
Denotation of logic will be used for comprehension. 
We have the following operations:  
 
For the concepts (denotative significances) 
Conceptual inclusion: ⊂ 
Conceptual conjunction: ∧ 
Conceptual disjunction: ∨ 
Conceptual implication: ⇒ 
 
For the extensions 
Inclusion: ⊂ 
Intersection: ∩ 
Union: ∪ 
Implicatión: ⇒ 
 
For the comprehensions 
Semiotic inclusion: 
S
⊂  
Semiotic conjunction: 
S
∧  
Semiotic disjunction: 
S
∨  
Semiotic implication: 
S
⇒  
 
Theorem 1: Denotative significances form a relationship of increasing order based on 
their extension and the descending order of their comprehension 
 
Proof:  
 
a) The relation is reflexive because if d-s ⊂ d-s, then d-s⊂ d-s in extension and c-s 
⊂
S
c-s in comprehension. 
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b) If d-si ⊂ d-sj and d-sj ⊂ d-si it is true that d-sj ⊂ d-si and d-si ⊂ d-sj in extension and 
c-si ⊂
S
 c-sj and c-sj ⊂
S
 c-si in comprehension. This indicates that the property set or 
property of d-sj is equal to d-si and conversely, since d-si and d-sj have the same 
characteristics, that, d-si = d-sj and consequently the relation is antisymmetric. 
 
c) If d-si ⊂ d-sj and d-sj ⊂ d-sk then d-sj ⊂ d-si and d-sk ⊂ d-sj, therefore d-sk ⊂ d-si in 
extension and c-si ⊂
S
 c-sk in comprehension. This shows that the properties of d-sj are 
d-si and d-sk are those of d-sj. The relation is transitive. 
 
Definition 14: Denotative significances are ordered according to chains with 
increasing order of extension and decreasing order of comprehension. 
 
Note 5: In extension, we go from the part to the whole. However, in comprehension, we 
will go from whole to part. 
 
We emphasized earlier that comprehension is the subjective component of the concept. 
For the human mind, the part is more complex then the whole.  It is a consequence of 
the fact that semantic complexity moves from the whole to the particular.  
 
Example 3: The extension of vertebrates, wherein the extension of fish is entirely 
formed for different fish species, whereas the comprehension of fish (aquatic vertebrates 
breathing air dissolved in the water, etc.) is more complex than that of vertebrates. 
*** 
 
We consider a language as a five-dimensional denotative space, consisting of the 
following dimensions: extension, comprehension, paradigmatic axis, syntagmatic axis 
and time axis (Figure 4). 
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Paradigmatic 
Syntagmatic axis
Extension
Comprehensio
Time 
 
Figure 4: Five-dimensional significance space. 
 
Note 6: Extension and paradigmatic axis expand Reality. Comprehension and 
syntagmatic axis contract Reality. 
 
Note 7: Extension and paradigmatic axis are dynamicl. Comprehension and 
syntagmatic axis are static.  
 
Additional study of multidimensional significance spaces will be presented in later 
writings. 
 
Hypothesis 1: We suppose the existence of an enumerable set of significants which we 
will call ם such that ם ={ },...,...,, 21 ωSSS . 
 
The discoveries in any field of knowledge only find hidden significants and reveal 
them. These significants were there before discovery but were revealed. 
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Hypothesis 2: We suppose the existence of revealed significant subset נ such that נ 
={ }ωSSS ,...,, 21  and נ ⊂ם.  
 
We suppose a series of subsets נ1 = { }1S , נ2 ={ }21 , SS ,….נω={ }ωSSS ,...,, 21 . Let ס be a 
set of denotative significances such that ס ={ }ωsdsdsd −−− ,...,, 21 . We establish a 
bijection between the set נ and set ס such that fD:נ→ס and fD(Si) = d-si (fig 5).  
 
S1
S2
.
.
.
Sw
d-s
d-s
.
.
d-s
fD(Si) = 
 
 
Figure 5: Bijection between נ and ס. 
 
Definition 15: To this function fD:נ→ס will call function of denotation. 
 
Dom(fD) = { }ωSSS ,...,, 21  
Rang(fD) ={ }ωsdsdsd −−− ,...,, 21  
 
Let L be a set whose elements are lexemes of a specific language and such 
that { }ψlllL ,...,, 21= .  
We will establish a surjective function from the set of denotative significances ס and 
the set of lexemes L such that fL(ס) →L and fL(d-si) = lj (Fig.6). 
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d-s2
.
.
.
d-sw
l1
l2
.
.
l
fL(d-si) = 
d-s1
d-s3
 
Figure 6: Surjection (onto) between ס and L. 
 
Definition 16: To this surjective function (onto) fL(ס) →L will call lexemic function. 
 
The cardinality of the domain of the surjective function fL(ס) →L is greater than or 
equal to the cardinality of its codomain: As fL(ס) →L is a surjective function, then ס 
has at least as many elements as L, in the sense of  cardinal numbers. Then CardL 
≤Cardס 
The same lexeme may correspond to different denotative significances.  
 
Example 4: Color is the perceptual property corresponding in humans to the categories 
called red, blue, yellow, green and others. In particle physics, color charge is a property 
of quarks and gluons that is related to the particles' strong interactions in the theory 
of quantum chromodynamics (QCD). Color charge has analogies with the notion 
of electric charges of particles, but because of the mathematical complications of QCD, 
there are many technical differences. The color of quarks and gluons is completely 
unrelated to visual perception of color. 
 
*** 
We can make the following composition of functions (Fig. 7): 
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S
d-s
l
fD fL
fL  o fD
 
 
Figure 7: Composition of denotative and lexemic functions.  
 
Let l be an arbitrary element of L. Since fL is surjective, ∈−∃ sd ס  such that fL(d-s) = 
l. Furthermore, since fD is surjective, ∈∃S נ  such that fD(S) = d-s. Therefore, fL(fD(S)) 
= fD (d-s) = l, or fL ° fD (S) = l. 
 
5. OVERCOMING -EXPANSION OF LANGUAGE 
 
We can not completely rely on our language for communication, but at the same time 
we should not rely blindly onit. How can we trust a limited language? How much 
connotative significance can the lexemes possess? The existence of different 
interpretations is proof of failure, in any text, a single meaning, and single connotative 
significance are intended. Language is a means but it is not an end; the real goal is the 
maximum capacity of revealing the hidden, yet unknown significants. We must be 
careful with language, because many times, rather than an essential tool for 
communication, it can be a veil that hides the deeper sense of reality. If we want to 
overcome the capacity of language to access a more specific sense, we must rebuild a 
metalanguage from overcoming the current language. When we refer to the 
"overcoming of language" we do not speak literally, but metaphorically, what we must 
do is to destroy the preconceptions of a particular language that prevents us from 
advancing knowledge of reality4. 
We must always remember this issue, both by way of overcoming language, as another 
way of specifying the meaning through the existing language. Therefore, every effort 
should work in favour of an expansion of a new kind of language that allows us to 
analyze questions that we cannot understand for lack of linguistic tools. As says de Paz 
Blanco (2007) 
                                                          
4It is noteworthy that the discipline of semantics was known much earlier, the Spanish Kabbalist 
Abraham Abulafia (1240-1292) (become popular in Bee Season, a film starring Richard Gere and 
Juliette Binoche) that presents ideas that are surprisingly modern. Abulafia tried to skip the limits of 
language delving into the hidden meanings of writing lexemes. He created metalanguages to overcome 
literal languages. He specialised in breaking those systems to access meta deeper levels (connotative 
depth) of each word. He used lexemes as tools to discover the hidden meaning of each of them, in relation 
to the root or origin of the word.  
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The word has a border that is most important as hiding what it shows. In the 
Hindu tradition the word is understood as the other side of silence, speaking the 
words that express the silence. In Hebrew tradition speaking the word no, means 
allowing the silence that is hidden by speaking words. So this is the first paradox: 
what cannot be said unleashes rivers of literature, which is indescribable, it is 
said. If I explain, I am not silencing. 
 
The process of revealing hidden significants can only be performed if we destroy our 
current linguistic limitations. Where does overcoming the structural limits of language 
lead? When we refer to overcoming our linguistic limitations, not only with an 
expanded language, but we expand the meaning of that literal language to a search of 
unknown connotative significances. This overcoming of the limits leads inexorably to 
new limits. But these limits are no longer structural products of language, but that will 
depend on the capacity of thought. So we have two levels of enlargement 
: In paradigmatic extension and connotative depth. 
Let ס={ },...,...,, 21 ωsdsdsd −−− be the denotative set. We supose the existence of a  
sequence de subsets such that  0ס={ }∅ , 1ס={ }1sd − , 2ס={ }ω21 , sdsd −− , 3ס 
={ }321 ,, sdsdsd −−− ,…., wס={ }ωsdsdsd −−− ,...,, 21 . Let { }ωtttt ,...,,, 210 be a 
temporal sequence. 
 
Definition 17: We define paradigmatic extension the sequence 0ס(t9), 1ס(t1), 2ס(t2), 
3ס(t3),… wס(tw). (Fig 8.) 
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Time
Paradigmatic axis
{Φ} {d-s
1} {d-s1,d-s2} {d-s1,d-s2,d-s3}
t1
t2
t3
 
Figure 8: The paradigmatic extension. 
 
 
Definition 18: We define as connotative deepening to the process of acquiring a 
broader comprehension of a particular denotative significance, with the property that 
this new comprenhesion can replace the previous connotative significances.  
 
Example 5:  
Significant: ☼ 
Denotative-significance: The Sun. 
Connotative-significances: 
c-s1= The Sun is a god. 
c-s2 = Anaxagoras reasoned that it was a giant flaming ball of metal even larger than 
the  Peloponnesus rather than the chariot of Helios, and that the Moon  reflected the 
light of the Sun. 
c-s3 = The Sun is a star but Earth is the center of the universe and the Sun revolves 
around the earth. Ptolemy estimated the distance as 1,210 times the Earth radius, 
approximately 7.71 million kilometers. 
c-s4 = Arabic astronomical contributions included  discovery that the direction of the 
Sun's apogee  is changing. 
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c-s5 = Copernicus's heliocentric theory. The Sun is the center and the Earth goes around 
the sun. 
c-s6 = The Sun is not the center of the universe. It's just one more star in a cluster known 
as a Galaxy. 
c-s7 = The Sun is the star  at the center of the Solar System. It is almost perfectly 
spherical and consists of hot plasma  interwoven with magnetic fields.  It has a diameter 
of about 1,392,684 km, about 109 times that of Earth , and its mass (about 
2×1030 kilograms, 330,000 times that of Earth) accounts for about 99.86% of the total 
mass of the Solar System. Chemically, about three quarters of the Sun's mass consists of 
hydrogen, while the rest is mostly helium. The remainder (1.69%, which nonetheless 
equals 5,628 times the mass of Earth) consists of heavier elements, including 
oxygen, carbon, neon and iron, among others. 
. 
. 
. 
c-sn 
*** 
 
We can summarize this process of deepening in Figure 9. 
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Significant
SubjectDenotative significance
(Sun)
c-s1 
c-s2 
c-s3 
......
c-sn
Connotative significance
Time
 
Figure 9: Process of connotative deepening 5. 
 
A limited capacity is reflected in our language; therefore, to reflect the expansion of 
thought, the language must be expanded. And through a cybernetic process that expands 
the language, there is an expansion of thought. We cannot expand thought if it not 
expressed within the language. And we cannot expand the language if there is not a 
need to reflect a certain type of thinking. Now, when we can make this a kind of original 
thinking within a language, this is when it expands. And when the language reflects the 
limits of thought, this is when you can again expand thinking beyond the limits 
                                                          
5The above example corresponds to the ideal case of a single culture. Understanding a culture other than 
ones own essentially involves understanding intersubjective rules that give meaning to actions and 
cultural products. In the language of an African people the lexeme ango means dog, but this tells us 
nothing about what a dog means for natives (do they hunt with their dogs or eat them, etc..), in contrast to 
what it means for a Westerner. If this happens with a simple term like a dog, how much greater is the 
disturbance when to bump into terms having a metaphysical reference? (Evans-Pitchard, 1965). 
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expressed within the language. It creates a vicious circle where with further expansion 
within the language there is greater unification and understanding of reality. The 
thought always expands beyond all possible language. The fact is that to communicate 
"hidden" thought we should "reveal" through language. And it is then that the process of 
linguistic revelation is the result of a revelation of thought that precedes it, but cannot 
expand more as the language has not been expanded in advance. This lack of expansion 
of language in turn prevents further expansion of thought, because the thought, to 
continue advancing, needs a few axioms or support points, which are precisely the 
constituents of language. Therefore, the expansion of language 6does not produce a 
mere description of the thoughts, but creates the basic lexemes for the future 
development of thought. We need then the existence of a special word to develop a 
certain type of thought, which could not be developed if we do not have the first word 
that is the fulcrum for new forms of knowledge. It is a temporary foothold, because we 
can always find specific words that can better clarify the discovered reality. Language 
is, in this sense, what creates new connections for the advancement of knowledge. The 
more connections are established, the more we can described the greater complexities of 
the hidden reality, which is hidden by default by just such connections. 
 
6. IS THERE AN IMPOSSIBILITY KNOWING REALITY? 
 
Let's make two different conceptions about knowledge of reality 
 
6.1. Spinozian conception 
For Spinoza (2007) a thing Φ either exists Φ∃  or it doesn't Φ¬∃  (first premise); where 
reality is co-extensive with a deductive, axiomatic system, it then follows that: 
1) Φ∃ as existing - it necessarily exists (because existence is co-extensive with a 
deductive, axiomatic system: its existence follows logically from those axioms) 
2) Φ¬∃ as non-existing - it necessarily does not exist (its existence must involve a 
logical contradiction within the axiomatic system) 
3) And so: if we cannot show that a thing cannot exist (i.e., if we cannot show that 
a thing's existence involves a logical contradiction, as with the square circle), 
then the only other possibility is that it must exist (its existence must follow 
logically from the axioms of the system.) 
 
6.2. Neoplatonic and mystical conception 
                                                          
6 What has unfortunately happened is a restricted expansion of language within each discipline in 
modernity. This expansion occurs within each scientific discipline independently, so that we now have 
another serious problem: we discovered that coordination between the languages of the various 
disciplines does not exist (despite language expansions), which leads to more confusion. Language has 
been expanded with separate form and now we do not know equivalences, which means the expansion of 
actual language has turned against ideas which should work towards the expansion of language. If the 
expansion of language should aim at a better understanding of the hidden realities, now that expansion 
has only served to disconnect the various fragments of reality and, to the lose linguistic equivalence on 
the depth of each cognitive discipline, we are in a new Tower of Babel. The worst language confusion are 
now different existing languages, and specialized languages that exist within each of the disciplines. 
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Suppose it is certain that there is absolute reality (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013b) as various schools of thought hold7 and certain schools of mystical 
                                                          
7 Plato's metaphysics is divided into four levels of reality and four epistemological ways of apprehending 
the Forms. The four levels of reality are: images, sensible objects, lower forms, higher forms. The four 
epistemological ways of apprehending are imagination, perception, reasoning and understanding. Those 
on one level of reality or awareness cannot recognize what is being said by those on a higher level.  The 
lowest level of awareness is illusion. Illusion is the practice of holding opinions based solely on 
appearances, unanalyzed impressions, uncritically inherited beliefs, and unevaluated emotions. The next 
level is informed awareness, which attempts to distinguish appearance from reality in an "everyday", 
common-sense way. Informed awareness is based on observations and perceptions of physical objects, 
not just images or representations of them. These lower two levels of awareness are part of the 
"becoming" layer of awareness and use the "becoming" layer of physical reality. The next level of 
awareness moves out of the realm of becoming and into the realm of being. This is the first stage of 
knowledge acquired through deductive reasoning. The final and highest level of reality moves beyond 
deductive reasoning. At this level, the soul has no need for perception or interpretation. Higher forms are 
directly understood, apprehended, and glimpsed. A further concept in Plato's metaphysics is that of The 
Good (Plato's God). The Good is the highest form possible. It makes the existence of everything else 
possible. The Good cannot be observed with the five senses and can be known only by pure thought and 
intelligence. In Plato’s Timaeus, the Demiurge is really an intermediary between the essential realm of 
non-materiality and the world of matter.  The Demiurge takes the inert substance of matter and acts upon 
it, bringing forth the templates of life from the realm of thought into the realm of matter. 
Aristotle considered the most fundamental features of reality in the twelve books of the Μεταφυσικη 
(Metaphysics). Although experience of what happens is a key to all demonstrative knowledge, Aristotle 
supposed that the abstract study of "being qua being" must delve more deeply, in order to understand why 
things happen the way they do. A quick review of past attempts at achieving this goal reveals that earlier 
philosophers had created more difficult questions than they had answered: the Milesians over-emphasized 
material causes; Anaxagoras over-emphasized mind; and Plato got bogged down in the theory of forms. 
Aristotle intended to do better. Although any disciplined study is promising because there is an ultimate 
truth to be discovered, the abstractness of metaphysical reasoning requires that we think about the 
processes we are employing even as we use them in search of that truth. As always, Aristotle assumed 
that the structure of language and logic naturally mirrors the way things really are. Thus, the major points 
of each book are made by carefully analyzing our linguistic practices as a guide to the ultimate nature of 
what is. Philo of Alexandría equates this with the Logos, whom he refers to as the “man of God”.  The 
Logos was originally conceived of as the active role of God as the principle of reason.  To this Philo adds 
Plato’s idea of forms, transforming the Logos into the Divine Mind – the idea of ideas or form of 
forms.  The Logos becomes the eternal Form of Wisdom for Philo. According to Plotinus, the basis of all 
reality is an immaterial and indescribable reality called the One or the Good. There are several levels of 
reality that emanate from the One or the Good, much like ripples in a pond emanate from a dropped stone. 
The second level of reality is Mind or Intellect (nous). Mind results from the One’s reflection upon itself. 
The level below Mind is Soul. Soul operates in time and space and is actually the creator of time and 
space. Soul looks in two directions—upward to Mind and downward to Nature which created the physical 
world. The lowest level of reality is matter. According to Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, matter is viewed 
very negatively. Plotinus, himself, held such disgust for physical things that he despised his own body. He 
did not celebrate his own birthday since the birth of his physical body was nothing to be celebrated. He 
also did not take care of his physical health or hygiene. For example, Plotinus had puss-filled sores on his 
body that he refused to care for. Unfortunately for his students, he liked to embrace his pupils, causing 
many of them to flee from their teacher. The function of language, or the extent to which language can 
function, is as the mirror reflection of the intellectual in discursive reason, in the facilitation of memory, 
in that, as Plotinus says, the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the intellectual act 
into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is 
apprehension and persistence and memory of it. The mechanism of perception mediates between the 
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or nous, in a dialectical process 
between the subject and the world. There must be an affection which lies between the sensible and the 
intelligible, as Plotinus puts it, a proportional mean somehow linking the two extremes to each other, the 
sensible form and the intelligible form. In the perception of an object, the object is already apprehended 
by the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving mechanism, the construction of intellect involving 
the mnemic residue and the intelligible form, through the use of geometry, as vision is understood in 
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thought. Let א8 be the Absolute Reality9. Any proposal on Reality must be included in 
one of the four following categories: 
   
P1) א 
P2) ¬  א 
                  P3) א ¬∧  א 
P4) neither א nor ¬  א 
 
Theorem 2: Any proposition based on a certain language L that includes the Reality א 
contradicts itself.   
 
Proof: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
relation to geometry and mathematics, the intelligible mechanisms as the underlying structure. In the 
Long Commentary on the De anima 3.1.5, Averroes posits three intelligences in the anima rationalis or 
the rational soul: agent intellect, material or passible intellect, and speculative or actualized intellect, also 
called acquired intellect. While material intellect is “partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal,” 
corporeal and incorporeal, the speculative and agent intellects are purely eternal and incorporeal. 
Actualized intellect is the final entelechy, or final actualization of potentiality. It is a form of intellectus in 
habitu, which can be both passive and active, corporeal and incorporeal. Material intellect is a possible 
intellect, a possibility, because it is both corporeal and incorporeal, thus neither corporeal nor incorporeal. 
Material intellect becomes actualized intellect through the affect of the agent intellect, which illuminates, 
as a First Cause, the intelligible form or forma imaginativa, the residue of the sensible form, the sensation, 
in the anima rationalis. The illuminated intelligible acts on material intellect until material intellect 
becomes actualized intellect, at which point intellect is able to act on the intelligible. Maimonides’ 
negative theology is complemented by other elements of his epistemology. He held that there are 
significant limitations on what human beings can demonstrate scientifically. It is essential to 
Maimonides’ philosophical anthropology that human beings have an intellectual essence, a rational nature 
capable of comprehending intelligible features of reality. Again, to say that man is created in God’s image 
is to say that a human being has a rational soul. In Maimonides’ view Adam and Eve could have led 
untroubled lives guided exclusively by clear intellectual conceptions of the true and the false, without 
concern with good and evil. Such lives would have been free of frustration, pain, anxiety, and fear. All 
that was required was that Adam and Eve heed the injunction not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. In eating of the tree they yielded to distraction from intellectual activity and sought 
satisfaction in the lesser objects of the imagination. Good and evil are not, in Maimonides’ view, 
demonstrable or intuited intelligibles. Our conceptions of good and evil involve the imagination. 
 
8 We have chosen the Hebrew letter Aleph used in the sense of Jewish mysticism: "God is One": the 
absolute unity of God. "There is none other besides Him:" "One, single, and unique. "One counts 
"nothing from something 
 
 
9 For Jewish mysticism, the only reality is Ein Sof as there is no time and space (Scholem, 1964). For 
there to be variables of time and space, reality must be created of emptiness. This is temporary according 
to whether Ein Sof is admitted into the vacuum, occupies it and nullifies the variables of time and space. 
Our reality is named with the letter ב and is a spatiotemporal reality derived from the true reality of א 
level and is called the reality of Ein Sof.  
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1) By P1 it is affirmed that א must be a being with the categories of absolute, 
infinite and limitless. Nevertheless, an absolute and limitless being א excludes¬  
א, and all exclusion is limitation. Therefore, the limitless being is limited and 
the affirmation is contradicted by itself.   
2) By P2, ¬  א excludes the being א and therefore it is limited, and the affirmation 
is contradicted by itself.  
 
3) By P3, reality includes as much א as ¬  א, that it is inherent as much in the one 
as in the other, but this excludes it from not being either the one or the other, to 
transcend א and¬  א. The affirmation is contradicted by itself.   
4) By P4, if is affirmed that neither א nor ¬  א, and it transcends both, excluding it 
from the property of immanency, that is to say to be equipped with א ¬∧  א. 
Therefore, the affirmation is contradictedby  itself.   
 
Therefore, since all affirmation belonging to a certain language L only has sense based 
on its opposite, it has been demonstrated that any affirmation is relative and if the same 
conceptthe Reality א, will be contradictory.   
A direct and positive affirmation on reality must be necessarily contradictory or devoid 
of meaning.  
a) It is contradictory as soon as the own affirmation comprises the Reality א, 
therefore talking about itself, and all affirmation trying to affirm something on 
itself usually is contradictory.  
b) It is devoid of meaning because to describe the whole is equivalent to not 
describe anything.   
 
This process corresponds to the futile attempt to divide the universe into observer and 
observed, narrative and narrated, separating it and joining it is thus false with the 
sameSubject. The linguistic communication, that in the amplest sense is simply the 
transmission of a concatenation of words, is not more than the reflection of the reality in 
a mirror of illusion. Two types of symbolic elaborations used by language exist to 
indicate or to suggest reality and that can be used in three main ways to speak about 
reality. Both types of symbolic elaborations are the following: 
 
1) Linear, one-dimensional, analytical and logical elaboration, and where 
a collection of symbols meticulously defined connects, one after another 
one, in a line, in agreement with its own particular syntax. It is the 
corresponding elaboration for scientific, philosophical and symbolic 
legal text.   
2) The imaginative symbolic elaboration. It is pictorial and 
multidimensional, being in myths, artistic elaboration, poetry, dreams 
and imagination. It lacks logic, in the strict sense of the word, but it 
locks up a meaning in a totally different way from the linear elaboration.  
  
Further developed study of paraconsistent logic applied to religious and mystical 
thought and mathematics applied to symbolism will written about laterpublications. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS   
 
According to Watts (2006), to study Eastern philosophies, especially Zen, it is remarked 
that the world of events and entities are more measured terms than phenomenological 
realities. To fulfill its function (linguistics), the names and terms should be syntactically 
fixed like all the other units of measurement and comparison. But their use is so 
successful that the danger of confusing these terms of measurement and comparison 
(model) with the measured world, is to confuse convention with ontology, and to reduce 
the rich reality to the model. Linguistic structure with which we form judgments or 
propositions does not allow a transitive verb without a subject or predicate. As Watts 
(2006) says, when there is "knowledge", the grammatical convention requires the 
existence of the knower and that which is known. Man is so used to it that when we talk 
and think, to build our models, he does not realize that it is just that, a convention, and 
that does not correspond to the actual experience of knowledge. 
The greatness and tragedy of man, his greatest adventure, knowledge, oscillates between 
two mythological characters Prometheus and Sisyphus. The first, stole fire from the 
gods. The second was condemned eternally to roll a rock up a mountain and reach the 
summit, but the rock rolls back to the foot of the mountain each time, so, eon after eon, 
so the work is useless. The stone of Sisyphus, with its eternal and useless rolling back 
from the top is one image of knowledge. The fire of knowledge itself drags the ashes of 
ignorance. Linguistic structures themselves impede the full apprehension of Reality א. 
Just being aware of it, just knowing our limits, we can begin to catch a glimpse of the 
Reality א that is being continually denied. And the only way we will achieve a basic 
principle of knowledge, which is so forgotten: humility. 
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